University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

5-2003

Design optimization of a multi-mission helicopter configuration
Steven E. Halpern

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes

Recommended Citation
Halpern, Steven E., "Design optimization of a multi-mission helicopter configuration. " Master's Thesis,
University of Tennessee, 2003.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/5234

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Steven E. Halpern entitled "Design optimization of a
multi-mission helicopter configuration." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis
for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.
Robert B. Richards, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Steven E. Halpern entitled "Design
Optimization of a Multi-Mission Helicopter Configuration." I have examined the final
paper copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major
in Aviation Systems.

Mr. Robert B. Richards, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:

Acceptance for the Council:

Vice Provost and De
Studies

DESIGN OPTIMIZATION OF A MULTI-MISSION HELICOPTER
CONFIGURATION

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Steven E. Halpern
May 2003

Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my father, Stanley Halpern, who impressed the importance of
education and hard work in pursuit of excellence upon us. Through his actions, he
showed the importance of strong ethics and family unity. I will be forever grateful for
the sacrifices he made for us and indebted to him for my wonderful upbringing. Rest in
peace.

11

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all those who helped me in completing the Master of
Science in Aviation Systems degree. I thank Dr. Richards for his guidance throughout
the thesis process as well as my test pilot education. I thank Mr. J.J McCue for helping
me to develop an understanding of helicopter performance theory as a TPS student. I
thank Sharon Kane for helping me stay 'on track'. I thank the engineers on the MH-60S
program whose ideas and valuable guidance contributed to the research work.
The completion of this degree spanned a period of 6 years, the birth of 2 children,
3 military moves, and countless other work-related 'crises'. I would like to thank my
beautiful wife Shannon, and my impressive girls, Gavi, Eva, and Ahna. Although this
work was completed in my off time, this time was actually your time and its completion
is a result of your understanding and encouragement.

111

Abstract
The MH-60S helicopter program is currently in the development stages of
incorporating provisions for the Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Mission and
the Armed Helicopter Mission. The integration of these mission provisions represents a
departure from the initial design goals of the MH-60S as solely a combat support
helicopter. This aircraft will ultimately be expected to execute in excess of 18 different
missions in place of seven existing aircraft rather than just serving as a replacement for
the H-46 helicopter.
Common to any aircraft program is the issue of weight growth. Weight growth
has been cited as a major risk on this program in light of the fact that there will be
provisions for both major mission areas in the final (FY 07) aircraft configuration. As a
result of not anticipating specific design impacts associated with the requirement to
perform a wide range of missions, the aircraft will not meet the requirements set forth in
the Operational Requirements Document. The fact that a single aircraft will be taking the
place of several aircraft that were implicitly designed for specific missions serves to
further increase the gap between the requirements and the realized, as-designed
performance.
The specific weight issue can be further clarified by a discussion of weight
growth over time and a study of how each mission area will add weight. Incident to this
discussion is a comparison of aircraft performance versus the requirements and the
associated shortfalls in range, time on station, and combat radius. There are many areas
where weight can be shed. Weight reduction and performance enhancements have
iv

become unfunded program requirements, resulting in detailed analysis and considerations
for postproduction changes to the aircraft. In this thesis, background and causal factors
for the weight/performance issue will be analyzed. Candidates for weight reduction and
performance enhancements that yield the greatest performance increase will be proposed.
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I.

Introduction

Background
Following the Gulf War, the Armed Forces experienced a period of major
downsizing. This downsizing was applicable to all areas and included but was not
limited to manpower and equipment. Naval war fighting doctrine including From the Sea
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2010/2020 operational concepts are the
documents which describe the reshaping and restructuring of the Naval Forces for the 2 1st
century.
A common thread throughout the doctrine is an increased emphasis on realigning
force structure to be able to support sustained, conventional threats as well as addresses
the unconventional/asymmetric threats that were highlighted September 1 1, 200 1. The
Naval Forces of the future must be able to fight in the littorals while maintaining the
capability to conduct traditional 'blue-water' operations by leveraging and
complementing the capabilities of other armed services. Ultimately, the collective
doctrine describes a large degree of flexibility to the war fighter while highlighting the
need to be a leader in technology.
A product of Naval Force restructuring is the CNO-approved Helicopter Master
Plan (HMP) of 1998. The HMP was initiated in FY 1996 and represented the plan for
helicopter aviation in response to the H-2 helicopter reaching the end of its service life.
Ultimately, the HMP drives a reduction from seven type/model/series helicopters
currently in use by the Navy to two; the MH-60S and the MH-60R.

The most obvious reason for this major change to force structure is to reduce
acquisition as well as operations and support costs while supporting the concepts
embodied in Joint Vision 2010/2020. The HMP acquisition strategy calls for a one for
one airframe replacement with either an MH-60S or an MH-60R. It is interesting to note
that the HMP is not based on war fighting analysis but only on life cycle cost reduction.
The HMP calls for retirement of the H-3, H-2, H-46D, H-60F, H-60B, H-1 and
the H-60H. The MH-60S will take the role of the H-46 in its VERTREP role and the H-3
and H-1 in its utility role. H-60F and HH-60H aircraft will be retired as the MH-60S
assumes their missions in the CVBG. The MH-60R will assume the H-60B and the H-2
missions. Figure 1 illustrates the migration of missions to an all H-60 helicopter
community.

( ) • CURRENT INVENTORY
I "' # •REQUIREMENT (PAA)

SH-60F

70

(75)

SH-60B 179 (168)
SH-2G

10

(10)

CH-46O 93

(70)

H-3

67

(56)

HH-1N

27

(21)

HH-60H 52

(38)

MH-53E 45

(43)
FY00

TOTAL:

543

...J

•I

vi

FY04

(481)

FY0S

?

MH-60R
243
MH-605

237

FY12
480

FIGURE 1: GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF HELICOPTER MASTER PLAN
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The MH-53E currently employed by the Navy for Airborne Mine
Countermeasures (AMCM) and Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) begins to reach the
end of its service life limit in FY 07. While the MH-53E was not specifically called out
in the HMP, unofficial references to the future of the MH-53E tentatively trace its
mission being transferred to the MH-60S. Furthermore, recent cost benefit analyses seem
to favor eventual replacement of the MH-53E aircraft with the MH-60S. It is anticipated
that a decision on whether to perform a service life extension program or retire the MH53E will need to be addressed not later than the POM 06 process (fiscal year (FY) 2004).
The HMP transition to an all H-60 helicopter fleet is not a drastic change in
capability except in the case of the MH-53E. In other words, the relative lift capabilities
of all seven helicopters are fairly close to an H-60. Although the author will explore this
area further, the transition from the MH-53E to an MH-60S possesses unique challenges
in the AMCM and heavy lift missions.

Concept of Operations
Related to the HMP is the development of the helicopter concept of operations or
CONOPS. Given an all H-60 helicopter fleet, the Navy must decide on a force structure
that will provide the greatest war fighting capability. CONOPS is chartered to provide
the correct numbers of helicopters combined with a streamlined command and control
structure. The goal of CONOPS is completion of infrastructure realignment and the first
MH-60R/S carrier deployment in FY 2008.
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Based on the introduction of the MH-60S and MH-60R, combined with the
retirement of the S-3, helicopter CONOPS has become a major driver in the realignment
of the battle group. The overall purpose, of course, is victory in combat. This will occur
by assigning the right number of helicopters to perform increased Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), and AMCM coverage. The battle group
(BG) commander will gain ultimate benefits as his situational awareness is improved and
force protection is increased. The obvious difference from current force structure is that
these benefits will be realized through the use of multi-mission capable, battle group
linked, H-60 helicopters.
Specifically, helicopter CONOPS brings four areas of force multiplication to the
BG commander:
1. Mitigation of the ASuW coverage gap as a result of the S-3 retirement. The
MH-60R and the MH-60S will operate synergistically in a sensor and shooter
role respectively. Most importantly there will be three times the number of
armed helicopters in the battle group that will provide a 24-hour coverage
capability.
2. Provides the required ASW coverage to meet the littoral threat. CONOPS
will also provide three times the number of dipping sonars available to the BG
commander as well.
3. Substantial Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Maritime Interdiction
Operations {MIO), Naval Special Warfare (NSW) capability resident in the
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battle group. Five-fold increase in the number of assets available to conduct
these types of missions.
4. Provides an organic AMCM capability to the BG commander. Currently, the
only AMCM asset in the Navy is the MH-53E. The MH-53E, because of its
size and the large logistics trail associated with current mine warfare sensors,
is not deployed as part of the battle group. MH-53E assets are known as
dedicated AMCM assets and can operate from either L-class ships or be land
based. These assets are known as dedicated AMCM assets because they are
employed in a "911-response" nature. When the mine warfare risk increases
either through intelligence or actual mining operations, AMCM operations are
initiated. The fact that the AMCM assets are not resident in the BG can have
serious implications as to where the BG can and cannot transit. Providing an
organic AMCM capability to the BG commander through the MH-60S greatly
increases his flexibility and ability to react quickly without having to rely
upon a protracted MH-53E response time.
The previous discussion of CONOPS dealt with the benefits gained by the BG
commander as a result of increased helicopter numbers resident on the carrier and the
MH-60S taking on many missions. CONOPS also calls for replacement of the
expeditionary structure. The two CH-46D helicopters currently deployed with the ARG
for amphibious SAR will be replaced by up to four MH-60Ss. The same number of MH60Rs will similarly replace the one or two SH-60B aircraft per ship deployed throughout
the battle group in independent surface action groups. Capability for other missions
5

including AMCM, heavy lift, Search and Rescue (SAR), Carrier Qualification (CQ)
detachments, and Very Important Personnel (VIP) airlift will be maintained from shore
based MH-60Ss and possibly MH-53Es. Although the MH-60R is a major part of the
HMP and CONOPS, the author will focus primarily on the MH-60S in this thesis.
From a war fighting and certainly a fiscal standpoint, the transition to two
helicopters that carry out all missions is a valid argument. The MH-60S must ultimately
be able to carry out 18 different types of missions. Although the inherent nature of a
helicopter is versatility, it follows that the degree of mission-specific optimization
ultimately drives performance in a specific mission area. A derived requirement' of
CONOPS and the HMP then is to develop the MH-60S in order to limit the degree of
specific mission sub optimization. In other words, the MH-60S will have to do all of its
missions well and cannot be designed for any one specific mission.

Operational Requirements
Leading up to the initial operating capability date (IOC) of the MH-60S (August
2000) the current HC helicopter, the H-46D, had been in service for 25 years and has
exceeded its service life. The mission needs statement which drove the operational
requirements document cited the urgency of replacing the HC helicopter.
The primary mission of the HC helicopter is to provide rapid airborne delivery of
personnel and material to Naval forces engaged in power projection. The secondary

1

Derived requirements are requirements that are not specifically listed, but become necessary in
order for the aircraft to successfully perform its anticipated mission(s).
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mission is to provide support to the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) by providing a
SAR capability. These two missions historically comprised the main capabilities of an
HC helicopter. In line with the HMP, however, the Operational Requirements Document
(ORD) also mandated that the replacement HC helicopter would also be required to
support the armed helicopter (AH) mission and the airborne mine countermeasures
mission. In fact, the ORD is written in such a manner that the HC replacement helicopter
is the base mission and that the AH and AMCM missions are additive to the base
mission.
The typical operational requirements document outlines the requirements that the
acquisition community must utilize in their procurement. Through the systems
engineering process, the specification of the chosen product is trace-linked back to the
ORD. In this manner, the acquisition community is guaranteed that the aircraft that is
being procured meets the requirements of the war fighter. In the case of the multi-mission
combat support ORD, the MH-60S is actually identified as the replacement. This
represented a deviation from the majority of ORDs in that the aircraft to be procured was
mandated. Paragraph 1.3 of the multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD refers to
the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that was performed to analyze what aircraft would be
best suited for this role.
The AOA supports the procurement of a MH-60S (a modified in-production
helicopter, which provides maximum commonality with the US Navy H-60s and
US Army UH-60Ls currently in service and fully supported by the DOD logistics
system) as the most cost effective approach to meeting mission requirements for
the Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) and Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD)
for Combat Logistics Force (CLF) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships
and maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) support for L-class amphibious ships.
7

For clarity, it should be stressed that the MH-60S was categorized as a new production
aircraft.
The major reason that· the MH-60S was approved was the large amount of
commonality it shared with the existing H-60 airframe and the resultant reduction in life
cycle costs. Although not specifically stated, it is obvious that the HMP was a major
driver of this solution. Furthermore, since the MH-60S would be based on a marinized
version of the existing, in production UH-60 Black Hawk, it was intended to be a quick
solution for an HC replacement aircraft.
Industry and the acquisition community certainly felt the pressure leading up to
the IOC of the MH-60S in Aug 2002. The Class A mishap rate of the aging H-46 had
increased drastically as a result of a rapid rise in the engine failure frequency rate. The
urgency of the requirement most likely resulted in the fact that the basic MH-60S
program turned out to be very successful as it was below cost and ahead of schedule. It
must be kept in mind that the basic program and almost the majority of the effort, both
technically and fiscally, was to field a replacement for the HC mission. Although the
ORD clearly mandated the follow-on AH and AMCM mission integration, these missions
were not the top priority for fielding a replacement for the H-46 helicopter.
Annexes A and B to the ORD delineated the requirements for Armed Helicopter
and Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures respectively. It was mentioned earlier in
this section that the typical ORD does not identify the system or aircraft to be procured.
The multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD not only mandated the aircraft to be
procured but also went on to identify the type of acquisition strategy to follow. The
8

Block I aircraft would be the VERTREP aircraft, Block II would incorporate AMCM
modifications, and Block III would incorporate armed helicopter provisions. The blocks
would be added under the premise of an evolutionary acquisition strategy where
increasing capability is fielded to the Fleet over the course of time.
The H-60 airframe was proven in the fleet and in the Army that it could
successfully be employed for a majority of missions. The MH-60S, although described
as a new aircraft, was still based on H-60 legacy design. Although multi-mission was
planned as future growth to the MH-60S, the H-60 airframe remained the 'box' to design
around. New missions, when added, would be based on reverse engineering. It is not
surprising that the additive nature of the armed helicopter and AMCM missions have
posed the greatest challenge to the program from a technical standpoint.

Statement of the Problem
The basis for design of the MH-60S was for utility missions (cargo and
passengers) and assumption of the role of the aging H-46 helicopter. As the Navy's HMP
and CONOPS evolved, the planned role of the MH-60S transitioned from an H-46
replacement helicopter to an aircraft that would be expected to. execute in excess of 18
different missions. To compound the problem, the MH-60S would assume the mission

capabilities of helicopters that were designed based on a specific mission. The
implications to helicopter design as a result of the multi-mission requirement should have
been considered in the early stages of the program. Ideally, this should be accomplished
prior to production.
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In the case of the MH-60S, the program was ultimately faced with
the task of integrating additional mission capability into an existing helicopter design
where aircraft performance was fixed. As a result of the planned aircraft provisions
combined with a wide range of operational requirements, the as designed MH-60S
performance capability quickly became inadequate. Design requirements for a multi
mission helicopter not addressed pre-design ultimately lead to the identification of
unfunded, unplanned weight reduction and performance enhancement programs.

IO

II.

Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures

History
Even prior to the Civil War, the use of sea mines had been identified as an
effective form of naval warfare. Although, initially classified as an "unethical" form of
naval warfare, the use of sea mines as a tactic became large-scale during the American
Civil War. Throughout the course of history many lessons were learned as to the utility
of mine warfare. The most vivid statement was made during the Korean War by the
Admiral Sherman with regard to the importance of mine warfare: "When you can't go
where you want to go, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. And
command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation for all of our war plan ..." (U.S. Navy
Mine Familiarizer, 1999). As technology developed so did the type and numbers of
mines as evidenced by their use in Vietnam and the Gulf War.
The sea mine remains a cost effective, offensive and defensive weapon within any
country's naval arsenal. The most evident use of mines was during the Gulf War where
two ships, the USS Princeton (CG-59) and the USS Tripoli (L�H- 1 0), both struck Iraqi
sea mines in the Persian Gulf. The mines that had probably cost on the order of several
thousand dollars caused damages far exceeding 20 million dollars to the two warships.
This graphic example from our recent history displays the utility of sea mines especially
to nations that have small navies. More important is the fact that our allies and
adversaries alike realize that the sea mine is a relatively inexpensive weapon that works
remarkably well in leveling the playing field between two unequal opponents.
11

The very threat of the presence of mines in the water will delay or deter the
movement of naval forces until the threat can be validated or neutralized. In future
conflicts, it is not unreasonable to surmise that mines pre-positioned either overtly or in a
clandestine fashion could limit our battle space dominance. It follows that the Navy is
committed to maintaining a viable mine warfare posture.

AMCM Defined
Currently, the primary mission of the AMCM force is to maintain the capability to
rapidly deploy worldwide to conduct independent or integrated MCM operations. This is
the current mission of the two HM squadrons that currently employ the MH-53E. The
task of locating and, if necessary, neutralizing sea mines must be executed as quickly as
possible in order to maintain battle group maneuverability. This must be accomplished
through all available MCM assets resident in the CVBG or ARG and augmented, as
necessary, by assets that are CONUS-based.
To adequately define the future requirements for AMCM, the CNO staff is
writing a Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) for Mine Countermeasures. The
CRD will provide broad requirements in all mine warfare scenarios including a mine
clearance timeline in strategic chokepoints and Sea Line of Communication to support
war fighting requirements. In order to meet the requirements, the CRD cites a family of
MCM systems that will combat the threat. The family of systems includes minehunting
sensors, minesweeping systems, and mine neutralization systems. These systems are

12

planned to be primarily deployed from the forthcoming AMCM helicopter platform, the
MH-608.
Mine warfare doctrine can be divided into two broad categories: mine hunting
and mine sweeping. The preferred method of locating and neutralizing sea mines is
through mine hunting which is conducted using sonar systems towed from the helicopter
or a pod mounted external to the helicopter. This method is preferred due to the ability to
rapidly respond to a threat combined with the fact that many complicated fuzing
mechanisms that include such features as ship counters and dormant periods. The mine
hunting systems provide for detection of both bottom mine as well as mines moored in
the water volume. These mine hunting systems are complemented by mine neutralization
systems that are mounted on the helicopter to neutralize the previously located mine.
In geographic areas where mine hunting is not practical, areas that possess poor
bottom characteristics, or where there is a large amount of clutter, mine hunting is not
practical. Influence minesweeping involves towing an influence system behind the
helicopter to cause mines to safely detonate. The influence system generates magnetic
and acoustic signatures similar to the target ship.

Organic AMCM vs. Dedicated AMCM
· The current approach to AMCM is through the use of dedicated MH-53E
helicopters. The purpose of dedicated assets, now and in the future, is to provide an
increased AMCM capability necessary to sustain long-term mine clearance operations or
short-term intensive operations.
13

Future requirements, however, point to the use of organic assets. Organic assets
are those assets that are resident in the CVBG or ARG vice assets that must be sent to the
area of operations. The AMCM missions will be fulfilled through the use of MH-60S
helicopters that are outfitted with removable AMCM mission kits, sensors, and weapons.
The BG commander will possess the equipment to quickly identify, detect, neutralize,
and avoid bottom, submerged and floating sea mines. A notional timeline of an organic
employment of the MH-60S helicopter in a typical mine warfare scenario is provided
below:
I . Battle group commander determines threat level.
2. Exploratory/Reconnaissance: Mine hunting sensors deployed from the MH60S to determine presence/absence of mines.
3.

Results of exploratory reconnaissance evaluated to determine whether BG
can transit through or avoid suspected area.

4. If adequate operational maneuver area is not available to BG commander,
mine clearance operations commence using AMCM MH-60S to deploy
neutralization or influence sweep systems.
The notional timeline provided above would be similar to a dedicated mission with
the exception that the MH-60S will actually be embarked on the aircraft carrier CV(N).
Dedicated AMCM would still exist and would be available to augment the organic forces
in the case of a major regional conflict. Ultimately, organic AMCM provides flexibility
to the BG commander and most importantly decreases the mine countermeasures (MCM)
timeline.
14

Annex B to the multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD states that the MH60S ". .. shall employ permanently installed aircraft equipment fixtures and removable
(roll-on/roll-off) AMCM mission configuration equipment kits that allow integration, .
deployment, and operation of the individual AMCM sensor or weapon on/from the
helicopter." The ORD also states that aside from providing the CVBG and the ARG with
an organic capability, it may also serve to replace the current Navy's force structure of
MH-53Es. As such the MH-60S will also become the dedicated AMCM platform. In
order to understand the intricacies involved with the MH-60S assuming the AMCM role
it is beneficial to briefly examine the differences between the two aircraft with respect to
size and performance as well as a brief look at the current AMCM mission.

Aircraft Description of MH-53E
The MH-53E is a three-engine helicopter produced by Sikorsky Aircraft. It has a
maximum gross weight of 69,750 pounds and is capable of sustained towing operations
of 25,000 pounds with surges up to 30,000 pounds.
There is a common misconception throughout the U.S. Navy that concept of
operations for dedicated mine warfare is solely through the use of a 'sled' that is towed
behind the MH-53E. Although the mission is deemed critical when threat levels increase,
the mission is not widely understood. The AMCM mission practiced in the Navy of
today includes a large amount of mission planning and post mission analysis based on the
tactical employment of a variety of sensors. The MH-53E commonly employs the
following systems in order to conduct the dedicated mission:
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1. MK-103 - A moored minesweeping system that is used to sever mines from
their moorings. The MK- 103 contains mechanical sweep wires that contain
explosive mechanical cutters as well as fixed non-explosive cutters. The
sweep is towed behind the MH-53E utilizing tensions of up to 1 1,000 pounds
and sweep lengths up to 2 150 feet.
2. AN/AQS-24 - A side-looking sonar that is towed behind the MH-53E. The
system is comprised of an actively controlled, towed underwater vehicle, an
electromechanical tow cable and winch, and associated controls and monitors.
The side-looking, multi-beam forming sonar provides the operator with the
ability to search for bottom targets as well as targets which are in the water
volume.
3. MK-105 - The MK-105 commonly known as 'the sled' is used to sweep
against influence mines. The system includes a platform that is stabilized via
hydrofoils when under tow behind the MH-53E. The MK-105 has the
capability of providing 2000 amps that is used to produce a magnetic
signature that mimics a ship. It should be noted that there are several ways in
which to launch the MK-105 from the well deck of an L-class ship to a beach
launch. All methods require a fair amount of manpower outside of the
helicopter crew as well as three small boats for stabilizing and tending the
MK-105 components during launch and recovery.
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4. MK- 1 04 .:... This system is used to sweep acoustic mines. As the MK- 104 is
towed through the water a cavitating venturi system utilizes the seawater to
generate noise that would mimic the acoustic signature of a ship.
5. MK- 106 � The MK- 106 is essentially a MK-1 05 with a MK-1 04 attached to
it. This system is used to sweep acoustic and influence mines.
6. · AN/SPU-IW - This system is also known as the magnetic orange pipe or
MOP. Although initially designed and employed to sweep against influence
mines, the MOP is most commonly used for training.
Although a discu�sion of current AMCM tactics is beyond the scope of this thesis,
current tactics revolve around the use of the AQS-24 for initial exploratory
reconnaissance of an area that is suspected to have been mined or is essential for
movement of the fleet. Once the threat is identified through reconnaissance it is either
swept or avoided. As discussed previously, there are _areas that cannot be effectively
evaluated using the underwater sonar which drives the requirement for sweeping or
avoidance �f the area. Where the area cannot be avoided, sweeping is essential.

Aircraft Description of MH-60S
In stark comparison to the MH-53E, the MH-60S is a twin-engine helicopter also
produced by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. It has a maximum gross weight of 23,500
pounds. Once modified the aircraft will have provisions for externally mounting AMCM
systems as well as towing up to tensions _of 6000 pounds.
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Organic AMCM (OAMCM) Systems
PMS-210, the AMCM program office, owns the acquisition programs for the next
generation AMCM systems that are intended to replace or augment the systems
previously mentioned. A notional diagram of the employment of OAMCM systems is
included in Figure B-12 and a brief description of the organic AMCM systems follow:
1. AN/AQS-20A - The Q-20A is essentially a follow on system to the legacy Q24. In addition to multi-mode sonar, the Q20A will have an electro optic
identification (EOID) feature that will provide for identification of mines in
the water volume. In aggregate, the system will have forward looking sonar
to avoid mines, side scan sonar to detect mines on the bottom and volume
search sonar to detect volume mines. The Q-20 will be towed behind the MH60S.
2. AN/AES- I - The AES- I or Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMOS)
will use Light Detection and Ranging technology (LIOAR) to detect, localize,
and classify near-surface moored and floating sea mines. The ALMOS will
provide organic self-protection, mine avoidance, and precursory
reconnaissance in the combat escort role. The ALMOS is a 'pod' based
system and will be employed by the MH-60S in a free flight (non-towed)
regime at groundspeeds up to 80 knots.
3. Airborne Mine Neutralization System - The AMNS will be employed by the
MH-60S to explosively neutralize unburied bottom and moored sea mines.
This system is also non-towed.
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4. AN/ALQ-220 - The Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep System
(OASIS) will provide an organic, high�speed, magnetic/acoustic influence
minesweeping capability to be employed by the MH-60S or selected surface
craft in support of the CVBG. An open-loop electrode design will provide the
requisite influence output in a self-contained, transportable unit weighing less
· than 1000 pounds. OASIS is essentially a replacement for the MK-106 that
will be towed from the MH-60S when influence/acoustic minesweeping is
deemed necessary.
5. Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System - RAMICS will be comprised of an
integrated targeting, fire control, gun system, and supercavitating projectile
technologies as a reacquisition and prosecution capability against near surface
moored and floating mines. RAMICS will also be a non-towed system.
From the brief description of the systems above it is apparent that there is no one
for-one replacement of current system with next generation systems. In fact, the organic ·
systems represent the elimination in the capability to perform mechanical minesweeping.
The fact remains, however, that the Navy is determined to have an organic AMCM
capability that utilizes an MH-60S. Furthermore, if these systems prove to be effective,
the Navy is on track to retire the MH-53E forwarding the complete AMCM role to the
MH-60S.
· The Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, continues to pledge support of the
MCM forces. In a recent letter delivered to mine warfare proponents, Secretary England
assures that he is committed to funding a potent mine warfare force while launching the
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organic force in 2005 (Inside the Navy, November 2002). This is consistent with the fact
that in the DPG of FY 2002, the Navy was directed to achieve organic mine
countermeasures capability in at least one CVBG by FY 05. In other words, not only is
the Navy committed to this effort it is also 'under the gun' to deliver this capability by
FY 2005.
The Navy has chosen this path for the future based on financial reasons despite
limited war fighting analyses. Although the subject of continued as well as future
analysis, it is postulated that the organic capability will be an acceptable replacement for
the current capability and will bridge the loss of the MH-53E.

2

Figures B- 1 through B-5 are included in Appendix B.
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III. Armed Helicopter
Current Concept of Operations
Currently, the HS and the HCS communities employ the HH-60H in a variety of
armed roles. The group of armed missions is covered under the broad term known as
CSAR. Currently, the HS community employs carrier based HH-60H helicopters to
perform the CSAR mission in addition to organic anti-surface warfare, Force Protection
(FP), and expanded Special Warfare Support (SWS) capabilities. In the reserve
component, HCS squadrons perform the same role with emphasis on CSAR also using
the HH-60H.
As the current world situation has developed over the past several years, the use
of armed helicopters for force protection as well as rescue of downed aviators in hostile
regions has become vital. The situation has also driven an increased role of the Navy in
special warfare missions both at sea and over land. The insertion and extraction of
SEALs is a perfect example of the increased usage of naval H-60s.

Armed Helicopter
The MH-60S, or armed multi-mission helicopter, will assume the role of the
current HH-60Hs in its armed configuration. The armed role, although equally as
complex as the AMCM mission, is more easily understood and is well known throughout
the fleet. Further, unlike in the AMCM mission, arming the MH-60S does not change the
nature of the mission as it is performed today. For these reasons, a protracted discussion
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of the armed helicopter mission will not be made. Simply stated, the MH-60S will be
modified so that it can also carry out the mission that is performed by the HH-60H of
today. Annex A of the ORD states "The MH-60S shall be capable of accomplishing the
CSAR, expanded SWS and SUW missions through the installation of mission kits
containing CSAR/SWS/SUW peculiar equipment." Just as in the case the AMCM
capability, the ORD mandates that the armed helicopter mission be additive to the base
combat helicopter support mission. " . . . The system characteristics listed herein are
additive to those delineated in the base Multi-mission Combat Support Helicopter ORD."
(ORD, 2002)
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IV. MH-60S Acquisition Strategy
Base Aircraft
As discussed previously, the baseline aircraft was a VERTREP replacement
aircraft. In order to save money and time, the Navy essentially procured a marinized
version of the Anny UH-60 Black Hawk. Although the UH-60 was in production, the
MH-60S differed enough from the UH-60 that it was handled as a new production aircraft
with its own production line and contracting strategy.
The MH-60S contained the baseline Black Hawk configuration with Naval Hawk
(SH-60) engines, rotor systems and dynamic components. It also included the Sea Hawk
automatic rotor blade folding system, folding tail pylon, rotor brake, and automatic flight
computer. Figure B-2 shows the relative make up of the MH-60S with respect to Black
Hawk baseline, Sea Hawk baseline, and new development components.
From figure B-2 is apparent that the MH-60S is essentially a marinized version of the
Black Hawk. The MH-60S production line at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is actually
the same line as the Black Hawk line. The line splits at the point where Sea Hawk
common components are installed. At the end of the production line, the MH-60S is
completely built with the exception of the cockpit.

Common Cockpit/Avionics
In the increasing attempt to maximize commonality between the MH-60S and the
MH-60R, a common cockpit was dev�loped and procured from Lockheed Martin. The
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common cockpit consists of two flat panel displays per pilot; one for mission information
and one for flight information. Each pilot also has a workstation that includes keysets
and access to pointing devices. The common cockpit also includes communication and
navigation subsystems, flight instruments, and manual operator input/output panels.
Backup flight instruments are provided in the center of the instrument console and
include airspeed, attitude, stabilator position, and clock. The cockpit is software driven
through the Avionics Operating Program (AOP) which is hosted on 2 flight management
computers.

Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy
The ORD clearly defined that future missions would be additive to the basic
combat support helicopter. In other words, the basic combat support helicopter would be
procured and future mission capability would be added. This is in contrast to developing
a helicopter that can complete all of its intended missions from the time it is delivered.
The sole purpose in a strategy such as this is to field an initial capability rapidly and
provide follow on capability when it becomes available. The basic combat support
helicopter would be fielded to answer an emergent requirement and AMCM and Armed
Helicopter would be fielded at a later date.
The acquisition strategy for the MH-60S calls for the procurement of a total of
237 aircraft. All 237 aircraft will be capable of performing the basic VERTREP mission.
Capability to perform AMCM and armed helicopter missions will be forward fit only. In
other words, the capability will be introduced into the production line when it is
24

available. It will not be retrofitted. This concept as well as the evolutionary acquisition
plan is displayed graphically in figure B-3.
Block I aircraft are the VERTREP aircraft. Blocks II and III will be AMCM and
armed helicopter respectively. From a production line standpoint, the AMCM
modifications will be cut in the production line starting with aircraft 51 and the armed
helicopter modifications will begin with aircraft 85. Aircraft 1 through 50 will not be
AMCM capable and similarly aircraft 1 through 85 will not be armed helicopter capable.
However, aircraft 85 and subsequent will have the provisions for all missions.
Figure B-4 is a graphical depiction of the MH-60S program. Block IIA will
include initial AMCM capability to include Q-20A and ALMOS and is planned for IOC
in calendar year 05. Block 11B will bring the remainder of AMCM capability and will
include RAMICS, OASIS, and AMNS in FY 2007. Block IIA is sometimes referred to
as the '05 configuration' and Block 11B is referred to as the ' final configuration'.
Block IIIA will provide an initial armed helicopter capability to the fleet in FY06.
The remainder of this capability will be fielded in Block IIIB in FY07 with yet future
growth in this mission area beyond FY 2007.
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V.

Mission Profiles

Definition
Included in the ORD are descriptions of the various types of missions that the
combat support helicopter must be able to accomplish. The ORD is written in such a
manner as to provide latitude with respect to the degree of meeting all of the
requirements. The threshold requirement is the minimum acceptable capability. The
objective requirement is the goal. Each mission area contains both threshold and
objective values. The ORD complete with Annexes A and B calls for a sum total of 20
missions.
In each section of the ORD, mission profiles are described using a scenario.
Unfortunately, the scenarios are open to interpretation with respect to aircraft
configuration. The base ORD missions are: VERTREP, VOD, Amphibious SAR,
Airhead Operations, NEO, SAR, SWS (OL). Verbatim descriptions of each mission
scenario from the ORD, proceeded by the author's interpretation where applicable,
- follow in the paragraphs below:

Base ORD Missions:
VERTREP
ORD Definition:
Ship-to-Ship, 500-1000 yds separation. Vertical takeoff to Hover Out of Ground Effect
(HOGE) for 15 seconds. Pick-up a maximum external payload of 5500 lb. (3000 lb.
average), transition to forward flight and climb to 150 ft AGL. Transit 500-1000 yds.
Descend to ship edge height, HOGE for 15 seconds and release payload.
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Ship-to-Ship, Connected Replenishment (CONREP) Position. Vertical takeoff to HOGE
for 15 seconds. Pick-up a maximum external payload of 5500 lb (3000 lb. average).
Transition to ship edge height, HOGE for 15 seconds and release payload."
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) Vertical Take off (VTO)/Hover out of ground effect (HOGE) for 15 seconds at
instrument rated power (IRP) at Sea Level / 90 degrees F, pick up external load of 5500
lb (3000 lb average)
3) Climb to 150 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL) at best climb speed
4) Transit 1000 yds with external load at 50 kts
5) Descend to Ship Edge Height (no fuel, time or distance)
6) HOGE for 15 sec, release payload
7) Climb to 150 ft MSL at best climb speed
8) Return without payload, traveling 1000 yds (Repeat cycles 2 through 8 up to
endurance of aircraft)
9) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or fuel for 20 minutes at maximum endurance
airspeed (Vbe ).
VOD
0 RD Definition:
Vertical takeoff with a crew of 3 to HOGE with a maximum 5500 lb internal payload
(3000 lb average). Transition to forward flight. Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best climb
speed. Transit 100 nm at cruise airspeed. Descend to HOGE, land and discharge
payload.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
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3) Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best climb speed
4) Transit 100 nautical miles (NM) at 99% of best range airspeed (V99%BR)
5) Descend Sea Level (no time, fuel or distance)
6) HOGE, Land and Discharge Payload
7) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or fuel for 20 minutes at Vbe
Amphibious SAR
ORD Definition:
Vertical takeoff and climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit 50 NM at maximum continuous power
to search area datum. Search for 30 minutes. Descend to deploy SAR swimmer from
either a HOGE or low altitude helocast (15 ft AGL/0 KIAS or 1 0 ft AGL/10 KIAS,
respectively). Maintain HOGE for 5 minutes per person while loading up to 12 survivors
as limited by endurance or aircraft capacity. Transition to forward flight. Climb to 500 ft
MSL. Return to own ship at maximum speed and land.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
3) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
4) Transit 50 NM at maximum continuous power (MCP) to search area
5) Descend to 100 ft (no time, fuel or distance)
6) Search for 30 minutes at Vbe

7) Descend to sea level (no time, fuel, or distance)
8) HOGE while picking up rescuees at 5 minutes per rescuee
9) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
10) Return 50 NM at MCP
1 1 ) Descend to ship deck height (no time, fuel or distance)
12) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe
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Airhead Operations
ORD Definition:
. Vertical takeoff to HOGE with a maximum payload of 5500 lb (3000 lb average) at 1000
ft MSL, 90 degrees F, in no wind conditions. Transition to forward flight climb to 1000
ft AGL and transit 12 NM offshore at cruise airspeed to ship. Descend to HOGE, land
and discharge payload.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/HOGE for 30 seconds at IRP with payload of 5,500 lb (3,000 lb avg) at 4,000 ft
/90 degrees F

3) Climb to 1000 ft above ground level (AGL)
4) Transit 12 NM offshore at cruise airspeed (V99% BR)
5) Descend to sea level
6) HOGE 1 minute and discharge payload

7) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or 20 minutes at Vbe
NEO
0 RD Definition:
Vertical takeoff at Sea Level, 90 degrees F, climb to 2000 ft AGL, transit at maximum
speed 100 NM to landing area. Descend to landing at 4000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F. Load
12 evacuees (2400 lb). Vertical takeoff, climb to 2000 ft AGL (6000 ft MSL), and transit
at maximum speed for return flight.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at 4,000 ft / 90 degrees F
3) Climb to 6000 ft at best climb speed
4) Cruise Out 100 NM at MCP speed
5) Descend to 4,000 ft / 90 degrees F
6) HOGE 10 minutes, pickup evacuees
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7) Climb to 6000 ft at best climb speed
8) Return 100 NM at MCP speed
9) Descend to landing at 4,000 ft / 90 degrees F
10) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe
MEDEVAC
ORD definition:
Vertical takeoff to HOGE with 4 SAR littered evacuees, 3 aircrewmen (2 pilots and 1
crew chief) and 1 corpsman. Transition to forward flight. Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best
climb speed. Transit 100 NM at cruise airspeed. Descend to HOGE, land and discharge
payload.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
with 4 SAR littered evacuees + 1 corpsman
3) Climb to 3 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
4) Transit 100 NM at V99%BR
5) Descend to seal level (no time, fuel or distance)
6) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe
SWS (OW)
ORD Definition:
Vertical takeoff with 8 combat-equipped Naval Special Warfare (NSW) personnel and
climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed. Transit 50 NM at maximum speed. Descend to
deploy NSW Team from either a HOGE or low altitude helocast. Maintain HOGE for 10
minutes while NSW team is deployed. Transit to forward flight. Climb to 500 ft MSL at
best climb speed. Return 50 NM at cruise speed and land.
Analysis: l ) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
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2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
3) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
4) Cruise Out 50 NM at MCP speed
5) Descend to Sea Level / 90 degrees F
6) HOGE for 10 minutes, offload 8 naval special warfare (NSW) troops
7) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
8) Return 50 NM at V99%BR
9) Land with greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe

Annex A (Armed Helicopter Missions):
CSAR
ORD Definition:
Vertical takeoff with 5 aircrew, sea level, 90 degrees F. Transit at best range speed 200
NM at 500 ft MSL, 100 ft AGL over the last 20 NM. HOGE for 5 minutes per survivor,
3000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F (at mid mission weight). Pick up 4 survivors at 200 lb each.
Transition to forward flight. Descend to 500 ft MSL. Return 200 NM at best range
airspeed and land.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
3) Cruise Out 200 NM at 500 ft at V99%BR
4) Climb to 3,000 ft MSL / 90 degrees F at best climb speed
5) HOGE for 5 minutes, while picking up 4 survivors
6) Descend to 500 ft MSL
7) Return 200 NM at V99% BR
8) Reserves: greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe
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SWS (overland)
ORD Definition:
Vertical takeoff with 5 aircrew and 8 combat equipped NSW personnel at sea level, 90
degrees F. Transit at best range speed 200 NM at 500 ft MSL, 100 ft AGL over the last
20 NM. Climb to 3000 ft MSL. HOGE for 5 minutes, 3000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F and
drop off payload. Transition to forward flight. Descend to 500 ft MSL. Return 200 NM
at best range airspeed and land.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
with 8 NSW troops
3) Transit at 500 ft MSL 200NM at V99%BR
4) Climb to 3,000 ft 90 degrees F at best climb speed
5) HOGE for 5 minutes, offload troops
6) Descend to 500 ft MSL (no time, fuel or distance)
7) Cruise back 200 NM at V99%BR
8) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe

suw
ORD Definition:

Detect and identify adversary missile patrol boats using a combination of the aircraft's
Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and cueing (e.g., radar vectors to the target) from naval
ships and aircraft. Attack independently using a precision-guided air-to-ground missile
or forward firing rockets/gun. In addition, the aircraft should provide air-to-surface
targeting designation for other friendly aircraft.
CV Plane Guard SAR
0RD Definition:
Vertical takeoff and loiter for 30 minutes. Climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit out to 100 NM
at maximum continuous power to search area datum. Search for 30 minutes. Descend to
deploy SAR swimmer from either HOGE or low altitude helocast. Maintain HOGE for 5
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minutes per person while loading 5 survivors (flight crew of E-2C). Transition to
forward flight. Climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit 100 NM at maximum speed and land.
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F
3) Loiter for 30 minutes
4) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
5) Cruise out 100 NM at MCP
6) Search for 30 minutes at 500 ft at best endurance speed

7) Maintain HOGE for 5 minutes per survivor while loading 5 survivors
8) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed
9) Transit 100 NM at MCP speed and land

10) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe
MIO
MIO is not listed in the ORD, but has been verbally added as a requirement.
1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F with 8 NSW troops
3) Transit 50NM at MCP speed
4) HOGE 15 minutes over ship
5) Remain on station for 45 minutes
6) Return 50 NM

7) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe
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Additional Annex A Missions:
Although not explicitly stated in the ORD, it is possible to conduct the CSAR and
the SWS (Overland) missions with the aid of inflight refueling. The missions are
conducted in the same manner as described above; however, the operator has the option
to plan a mission based on the availability/non availability of tanker assets. Receiving
fuel from a tanker at an appropriate time in the mission permits the operator to manage
own aircraft gross weight and time on station/range.

Annex B (AMCM Missions) :
Unlike the basic missions and the Annex A missions, the AMCM missions are
grouped based on flight regime. The ORD classifies AMCM missions as either free
flight, hover or tow. The ALMOS mission is considered a free flight mission. The
AMNS and RAMICS missions are considered hover and the Q-20 and OASIS missions
are classified as tow missions. The ORD further stipulates that all AMCM missions are
assumed to be flown sea level, 90 degrees F, and no wind.
Free flight missions are defined in the ORD:
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to four aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission
radius (transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform AMCM
mission search profile: maneuver at 60 knots ground speed for 120 minutes.
Transition to maximum range speed at 500 ft MSL. Return 30 NM and land.
The basic requirement for the ALMOS mission is a 2-hour on station time with a combat
radius of 30 NM. Hover missions are similarly defined in the ORD:
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to four aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission
radius (transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform an
AMCM hover mission profile: stationary hover not to exceed 30 minutes at
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optimum mission altitudes ranging between 25-1 000 feet (depending on weapon
system standoff requirement) followed by forward flight to acquire new target.
Repeat this cycle for a total of 7 5 minutes. Transition to maximum range speed at
500 ft MSL. Return 30 NM and land.
The interpretation of the hover mission definition is that for the AMNS and RAMICS
missions, the MH-60S is required to remain on station for a total of 7 5 minutes. During
these 75 minutes, the aircraft would vary altitude and transition from hover to forward
flight in order to prosecute as many mines as possible. Also included in this definition is
the 30-mile combat radius.
The most demanding of the AMCM missions are the towed missions. The ORD
definition of a towed mission is:
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to 4 aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission radius
(transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform AMCM
equipment deployment from the helicopter (stationary hover at optimum
deployment altitude for 15 minutes). Transition to AMCM tow operations at
optimum altitude between 75 to 200 ft AGL. Perform an AMCM hunt/sweep
mission profile (impart up to 6,000 lbs. tension) for 60 minutes. Perform AMCM
equipment recovery on the helicopter (stationary hover at optimum recovery
altitude for 15 minutes). Transition to maximum range speed at 500 ft MSL.
Return 30 NM and land.
Further analysis yields the following profile/timeline:
1 ) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F.
3) Transit at 500 ft MSL 30NM at V99%BR
4) Descend to 75 ft AGL.
5) HOGE for 15 minutes, deploy AMCM gear
6) Climb to 125 ft AGL and tow at prescribed tension for 60 min
7) Descend to 75 ft AGL.
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8) HOGE for 15 minutes, recover AMCM gear
9) Transit at 500 ft MSL 30NM at V99%BR
10) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe
The ORD places additional requirements with respect to the towed missions in the areas
of temperature and wind limitations. For a hot (105 degree F) day, the tow requirement is
reduced to 30 minutes with a combat radius of 10 NM. Every other parameter (as listed
above) remains the same. The ORD also specifies that the aircraft have the capability to
conduct tow operations with a 10 knot relative tailwind for up to 30 minutes.
Additionally for each of the scenarios, the ORD specifies that the aircraft have the
capability to impart up to 6,000 pounds of tension on the tow cable.

Summary
A summary of mission requirements is provided in Table A-1 3 • The aggregate of
these missions define the ORD requirements for the multi-mission helicopter. Also listed
are those missions which have been designated a key performance parameter (KPP).
KPPs are a subset of missions deemed essential for success of the program.

3

Tables A- 1 through A-6 are included in Appendix A.
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VI. Basic Aircraft Weight Growth
Weight is probably the most critical design element of a new production
helicopter. Simplistically, increase in air vehicle weight directly reduces performance
and mission payload. Weight must be monitored closely from the initial design phases,
throughout production, and once fielded following post-production modifications. The
MH-60S, like any new production aircraft program, has experienced unplanned weight
growth throughout design and production. The fact that this aircraft started out as a basic
VERTREP aircraft replacement with planned mission growth to AMCM and armed helo
made the control of basic weight growth critical to the success of the program. In other
words, control of weight growth in the basic aircraft is important. The fact that this
aircraft must "grow" to support other missions makes weight the critical design element
in a multi-mission helicopter.
The weight growth of the MH-60S can basically be divided into three distinct
categories. The first category is weight growth attributed to fielding the basic airframe
including modifications that were either planned as post production modifications or
modifications which became necessary to correct deficiencies noted during
developmental and operational testing. The second source of weight growth is that
weight which is attributed to incorporating the fixed aircraft provisions for the AMCM
and armed helicopter missions (Blocks IIA and IIIA) for the FY 2005 configurations.
The third source of weight growth is associated with the planned increase in capability
for the Blocks IIB and Block IIIB, C or final configuration. The last two sources of
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weight growth are directly attributed to and result from the evolutionary strategy of
introducing new capability to the fleet as soon as it is available.
It was mentioned previously that the MH-60S is essentially a Black Hawk that has
been marinized. It follows that a large contributor of the MH-60S weight growth was
through marinization. Another factor is manufacturing variation. Despite the closest
process controls, variation in manufacturing is ultimately unavoidable. This variation has
also caused a net increase in basic weight.

Marinization
Tablel is a comparison of the weight empty of three variants of the H-60.
The MH-60S airframe is based upon the UH-60L 'Black Hawk' which is currently in
production for the U.S. Army. Based on the differing types of projected operating
environments, the MH-60S required marinization of the basic Black Hawk airframe.
Specifically, increased structure to allow for more stringent crash loading and folding
blades in order to provide shipboard compatibility. From Table 1, areas where major
weight increase is observed is in the rotor group (3 87 pounds) which is attributed to blade
fold provisions, the body group (3 17 pounds) for increased structure to handle crash
loads, and the propulsion group (347 pounds) primarily for crash resistant fuel cells and
installation of a rotor brake. Other areas where the most significant amount of weight
increases occurred were in the electrical group, avionics group and cargo load handling
group primarily for a rescue hoist and cargo rollers and rails. Overall, the marinization of
the Black Hawk accounts for a weight delta of 2, 1 16 pounds or a weight growth of 1 5%.
38

TABLE 1: WEIGHT EMPTY COMPARISON (POUNDS)
Component
Rotor Group
Tail Group
Body Group
Alighting Gear Group
Engine Section or Nacelle Group
Air Induction Group
Propulsion Group
Flight Controls Group
Auxiliary Power Plant Group
Instruments Group
Hydraulic & Pneumatic Group
Electrical Group
Avionics Group
Armament Group
Furnishings & Equipment Group
Air Conditioning Group
Anti-Icing Group
Load & handling Group
WEIGHT EMPTY

UH-60L
92-26408
1 ,504
424
2,049
480
1 97
69
3 ,292
991
1 82
207
149
410
446
38
1 ,045
57
94
53
1 1,686

I

HH-60H
MH-60S
1 65154
165778
Pounds
1 ,9 1 9
1 ,891
454
461
2,257
2,366
683
500
157
1 98
68
77
3,528
3 ,639
1 ,068
1 ,039
1 80 1
1 83
266'
144
159:
1 52
5 82
479 1
882
82 1 I
3 81
90
956
1 , 1 10
138
141
108
1 14
345
1 83
13,572
13,802

Although this appears to be a fairly substantial increase in gross weight it does
happen to be very close to the weight of the HH-60H. For comparison purposes, the HH60H is often referred to as the baseline or "slick" version of the H-60 family. The result
to the Navy is two fold: ( 1 ) a new aircraft (MH-60S) is procured which contains the
derived benefits of being common with an in production aircraft (UH-60L) and (2) the
MH-60S is close to the weight of the baseline version of the H-60 (HH-60H) thus
providing a known performance capability (prior to any weight growth as a result of
multi-mission).
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Manufacturing Variation
Although it is the goal of any aircraft manufacturer to improve process control,
the fact that there will be differences between the weights of production aircraft as they
leave the line remain. Many parts of the MH-60S are made through high-speed
machining and then built up by hand. The ultimate result is multiple tolerances and
variation in basic weight.
The variation in basic weight for the MH-60S is addressed in the aircraft
specification. Based on historical data, Sikorsky has seen variations in weights up to ½%
of the average empty weight. In the case of the MH-60S, the specification contingency
weight is 70 pounds. The weight between aircraft can vary as great as 70 pounds and still
be acceptable. This total amount of weight must be included when doing performance
calculations and throughout the course of planning for additional missions.

Integrated Maintenance Diagnostic/Health Usage Monitoring System
(IMO/HUMS)
The !MD/HUMS system was a planned improvement to the MH-60S from the
early design stages. It is completely unrelated to the weight growth experienced as a
result of multi-mission. Once incorporated into the aircraft, this system will add a total of
73 pounds to the gross weight. It is anticipated that the IMO/HUMS modification once
established in the production line will be a forward fit and a retrofit as depicted in figure
B-3 .
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Vibrations
Throughout the developmental and operational flight test of an aircraft it is not
uncommon to discover design deficiencies that require correction prior to fleet release.
. In the case of the MH-60S, a deficiency noted during flight test was the low/medium
frequency vibrations at airspeeds typically flown during the VERTREP mission. This
deficiency was listed as a Part I, which means that it had to be corrected immediately.
As the design of the aircraft continues to mature and more hours are flown it is
anticipated that the vibratory nature of the VERTREP flight regime may result in
airframe changes and future weigh growth. The initial repair to the vibrations is to
modify a vibration absorber on the main rotor head with an ultimate weight growth of
twelve pounds.
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VII. Multi-Mission Weight Growth
It was mentioned that basic airframe weight growth as a result of making the

aircraft capable of more missions is the key design constraint to the multi-mission
helicopter. Prior to evaluating the specific amount of weight anticipated as a result of
increased mission capability it would be beneficial to understand how air systems are
introduced into a helicopter. It is fairly common, especially in aircraft that have more
than one mission, to develop a mission kit. This is the approach that was used in the
design of the MH-60S. The kit contains items that are not in the basic aircraft
configuration which permit the aircraft to perform other missions.
A mission kit is typically comprised of two parts: an A-kit and a B-kit. The A-kit
is defined as fixed aircraft provisions. As the name implies, A-kit items are fixed and
become a part of the basic aircraft. An example of an A-kit item would be structural
modifications to allow the structure to withstand increased fatigue loads. The B-kit parts
are removable items that are installed prior to the specific mission and removed upon
completion. An example of a B-kit item would be the common console for AMCM that is
installed prior to AMCM missions and then removed.
It follows that in the design of a multi-mission helicopter there is an optimal

balance between A-kit and B-kit items. If the shift favors a large number of A-kit items
then the aircraft must carry this extra weight regardless of mission. If the shift favors a
large amount of B-kit items then there is a commensurate increase in logistics support
requirements and the time it takes for aircraft reconfiguration between missions.
42

Armed Helicopter Weight
Based on a review of the ORD missions and multiple meetings with the requirements
officer, a list of assumptions for armed helicopter were generated. These assumptions
ultimately drove the makeup of the A-kit for armed helicopter. The A-kits and
corresponding weight that are required for the armed helicopter are summarized in Table
2. In aggregate, the weight increase to the basic gross weight due to armed helicopter A
kit items is 391 pounds. This represents an increase of 3% to the empty weight of the
MH-60S as it was originally designed.

AMCM Weight Growth
AMCM, because it involves towing a device in the water, brings with it a requirement for
a large amount of structural modifications to the base aircraft. In order to tow a Q-20A
and the OASIS, a "tow point" must be added to the aircraft with its corresponding
structural support. The "bath tub", portrayed in figure B-5, represents the major
structural member of the aft transition section of the MH-60S. This area required
modifications for the tow point as well as the incorporation of fittings that would in tum
accept floor tie downs for AMCM equipment including a winch and a CSTRS (Common
Stream Tow Recovery System). Specific modification of this area included the addition
of beams and widening of structural members. Additionally, it is planned that the
RAMICS system will cause structural modifications as a result of the relatively large
amount of recoil associated with this gun system. In addition to structural modifications,
AMCM capability requires the addition of a fourth hydraulic system in order to power
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TABLE 2: ARMED HELICOPTER WEIGHT GROWTH (A-KITS)
Weight (lbs)

Item

Auxiliary fuel tank provisions

36

Refueling probe provisions

68

Link 16

12

CSAR/Integrated self defense items
Avionics rack provisions
GAU-16/19 structural provisions
EFS fixed forward fire provisions
Signal data conditioner (SDC) provisions

275

PIU provisions
HUD provisions
Mission computer provisions
FLIR hand control unit (HCU)
AN/APR-39 provisions
Total Armed Helicopter A-kit

391
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a winch, as well as power distribution provisions. The total weight of the A-kit for
AMCM is 333 pounds or a 2% weight growth.
Associated with AMCM (and most likely the AH mission) is the requirement for
a tactical data link. The plan is also to make this a "kitable" item with a resultant A-kit
weight of 57 pounds.
The resultant increase in aircraft gross weight as a result of the multi-mission
requirement is summarized in Table A-2. If we combine this weight growth with the
weight associated with marinization (Table 1), the weight associated with pre planned
improvements (IMD HUMS), and the weight associated with resolution of discrepancies
identified in testing (to date), the overall impact to the basic aircraft as a result of
designing a multi-mission helicopter is derived in Table B-3. Table B-3 shows the
realized impact of modifying a helicopter that was originally designed to perform only
VERTREP to a helicopter that has the provisions to perform multiple types of missions.
An increase of approximately 1000 pounds to the empty gross weight was an unplanned
result of adding these provisions. Further, the significance of an unplanned event implies
little to no funds or schedule available to make changes.
It should be noted that the Navy was able to make small, initial adjustments to the
design to allow for the increased gross weight. These adjustments included removal of a
row of crew seats, the use of lighter fuel tanks, and lighter pilot seats. Regardless, the
initial attempt at weight savings was only 140 pounds.
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Mission Kits
The real significance of the 1000-pound increase in aircraft empty gross weight is
graphically displayed as aircrew, fuel, and mission kits (B-kits) are added. Table 3 lists
the projected operating gross weights for each mission planned for the MH-60S for the
FY 2007 or final configuration.
TABLE 3: OPERATING GROSS WEIGHT
Mission

Gross Weight, Pounds

VERTREP
VOD
Amphibious SAR
Airhead
NEO
Medevac
SWS (OW)
CSAR
CV Plane Guard
SWS (OL)
SWS (OL) w/ inflight re fueling
O-20A
ALMDS
OASIS
RAMICS
AMNS

21000
22330
18053
22,660
18228
18808
20662
22596
22000
22914
23221
22764
22664
21324
22770
22300
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VIII. Limiting Aircraft Performance Factors
The previous discussion of the unplanned weight increase as a result of the spiral
acquisition strategy would not be a problem if the MH-60S had unlimited performance
capabilities. This is obviously not the case. In fact, the MH-60S ORD requirements were
based on the current perfonnance of the HH-60H. As the weight empty of the MH-60S is
projected to be approximately 1000 pounds heavier than the HH-60H and both aircraft
share a common drive train and rotor head, it follows that the MH-60S will be incapable
of completing its ORD missions without a combination of a weight reduction program or
performance enhancements.
The definition of limiting performance factors as applied to this thesis is the
causes for the difference between the planned multi-mission helicopter performance
based on the HH-60H capabilities and the realized performance of the MH-60S.
Throughout the development of the MH-60S these limiting factors ranged from limits of
the basic aircraft due to gross weight to performance limitations as a result of ORD
interpretation. An example of a limiting performance factor as a result of ORD
interpretation is invoking of a requirement for a power margin or the existence of excess
torque to provide a safety margin in certain situations.
In a helicopter designed for a specific type of mission, the range of operating
environments is bound. For example, a helicopter which is designed to perform
VERTREP and other fleet support missions would be expected to perform its mission
carrying cargo either ship to ship or ship to shore. In the case of the MH-60S, the
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requirement for multiple missions means that the helicopter will operate in a wide range
of operating regimes. These regimes range from overland while conducting the SWS
(OL) mission to high altitude while conducting the airhead mission to low over water
while towing a Q-20 in the AMCM role. This operating range essentially covers every
possible regime that a helicopter could be expected to operate in. The unplanned increase
in weight empty combined with the requirement to include extra safety margin serve
further to reduce future capability of the MH-60S

Gross Weight
Regardless of the mission, helicopters have a given amount of power available
limited either by engine or transmission performance. The MH-60S NATOPS lists the
maximum gross weight as 23,500 lbs. This is the maximum structural limitation of the
aircraft. NATOPS currently lists the maximum internal weight as 22,500 lbs. Based on
Table 3, the maximum gross weight is not a factor in the final MH-60S configuration.
The maximum internal gross weight on some missions, however, does now become a
limiting factor resulting in a reduction in the amount of fuel that can be carried with a
resultant decrease in range/endurance.
Issues occur in helicopter design when the maximum gross weight must be set
lower than the maximum structural gross weight. This is usually a result of
developmental testing where a specific flying quality results in a reduced maximum gross
weight. This also happens to be the case in the MH-60S. During dynamic interface
testing conducted as a part of MH-60S developmental testing it was noted that at gross
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weights in excess of 22,000 pounds unacceptable pilot workload was required in the
approach to landing regime on combatant ships (destroyers and frigates). As a result of
these adverse handling qualities a recommendation out of developmental test was to limit
the maximum takeoff gross weight of the MH-60S to 22000 pounds when operating from
small decks. This requirement would not apply when operating from larger decks such as
L-Class ships (LPD, LHD, LHA) and aircraft carriers. Since the ORD requires the MH60S to operate from combatants, the 22000 maximum gross weight further limits aircraft
performance.

Hover Out of Ground Effect (HOGE) Limits
Another aircraft limitation is the maximum weight at which the helicopter can
hover out of ground effect. This weight applies to shipboard takeoffs where in most
cases the aircraft will be in an out of ground effect hover as soon as it clears the deck
edge. The maximum weight an aircraft can hover out of ground effect is a function of
power available which is a function of ambient conditions.
Most of the ORD missions are based on sea level/ 90 degrees F or 3000 ft/90
degrees F. Utilizing the hover charts in the MH-60S NATO PS, the aircraft can HOGE at
22,650 lbs sea level/90 degrees F and 20,200 lbs 3000 ft/90 degrees F. Referring to the
mission profiles chapter in this thesis, the requirement to HOGE applies to any mission
which starts out from the ship as well as the missions which have a specific mid-mission
HOGE requirement such as SWS (OL). Once again, comparing these weights to the
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operating weights in Table 3, the increased gross weight as a result of multi
mission provisions has a negative affect on aircraft performance.

Takeoff Criteria
Takeoff criterion, or the amount of power available for a safety margin, has been
a subject of discussion for many years. Helicopter performance is based on shaft
horsepower produced by the engines (power available) and shaft horsepower required by
the main and tail rotors, drive system and accessories (power required). In a flight test
quality, still air hover, power available equals power required and the helicopter neither
climbs nor descends. For this to happen the pilot determines for a given pressure altitude
and environmental condition the engine power available and the gross weight requiring
that power available. For the heaviest gross weight there is no power margin.
The expression power margin and torque margin are sometimes used
interchangeably. Because pilots fly based on a torque setting, shaft horsepower is
converted mathematically to a torque value. The pilot flies based on a torque setting
where 1 00% correspond to a reference amount of power (2828 shaft horsepower for the
H-60) at 100% main rotor revolutions per minute (RPM). Furthermore, pilots calculate
mission parameters based on torque available and torque required. The ability to hover
with a 10% torque margin is calculated utilizing the NATOPS performance charts
artificially reducing the engine power available by 10%.
The specific torque margin discussions, however are typically held in an ad hoc
manner as part of pilot training, ready room discussions, NATOPS manuals, and unit
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level operating procedures. The inclusion of this safety margin has never been included
in the design phase of a helicopter because historically missions were not planned to
- utilize 100% of the power available for takeoff and hover. As the basic operating weight
of the MH-60S increases, many missions will in fact require 100% of the power available
(prior to any future weight reduction program). Naturally, the definition of power margin
in the case of the MH-60S cannot be left to the post-design audience and now must be
addressed at the Systems Command level prior to IOC. Further, the varying opinions on
this subject make it very difficult to formalize.
In the case of the multi-mission helicopter, the ORD specifies mission takeoff
gross weight. For example, in the CSAR mission the direction is " . . . vertical takeoff to
HOGE with 5 aircrew, sea level, 90 degrees F . . . . " The operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) pilots will be applying a 10% torque margin to power available to determine
takeoff gross weight (TOGW), based on common fleet procedures. Since the mission
will have allocated 100% of the power available for takeoff, the addition of the 10% will
exceed the power available and not permit conduct of the mission.
Currently, the requirement for a torque margin capability varies by aircraft and by
service: For example, many of the wind envelopes that list wind limits for takeoff and
landing from ships prescribe a specific torque margin. The HH-60H NATOPS prescribes
a 10% torque margin for takeoffs from the aircraft carrier, Spruance class destroyers, and
oilers.
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Vertical Rate of Climb (VROC)
The same discussion for torque margin in a HOGE also applies to VROC.
Specifically, the "practice" of applying additional margin which ensures that the pilot
will have excess power to climb in a given situation. As in the previous discussion, the
concept of a VROC margin is discussed because the aircraft is required to do all
missions. Obviously torque margin and VROC are related. If there is a torque margin
then there is the ability for the aircraft to climb. In the case of the H-60, a 5-6% torque
margin yields a 500 foot per minute (fpm) VRQC. VROC is typically planned when
dealing with maneuvering flight such as in the AH and some of the combat support
missions such as NEO. The CSAR maneuver guide, for example, requires that during
mission planning a percent torque margin for all maneuvers be established which
ultimately indicates the level of risk. A margin of greater than I 0% is indicative of low
risk whereas a torque margin of less than 5% would indicate a high-risk flight. Similarly,
the H-60F/H NATOPS states that power equal to HOGE plus 5% may be required during
the waveoff or landing abort from a confined area landing site.
Other sources of comparison on this issue include the Army ORD for the Black
Hawk and ADS-33 Flying Qualities Specification. For the Army ORD, the design
requirement is 4000 ft/95 degrees F, using 95% takeoff power and 500 foot per minute
VROC. This satisfies the real world requirement to hover OGE at 6000 ft/95 degrees F.
The number 500 fpm VROC is also mentioned in ADS-33 as a steady state requirement
for level I (the best) handling qualities.
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The question that is unclear is how much margin or VROC capability is required
for each situation. The answer to whether which should be the metric a 10% torque
margin or a 500 fpm VROC is subject to debate. The bottom line is that some ability to
establish a vertical rate of climb is necessary. The 500 fpm VROC, however, is not a
rigorously defendable or traceable value. Currently, the answer is very subjective with the
answers all over the scale from a 0% requirement to at least 10%. Regardless of the
answer, the fact remains that there are different requirements driving the MH-60S design.
The ORD allows for zero margin because 100% of the performance is utilized for the
mission yet the test community and the fleet will expect a torque margin of some degree.
The addition of the airframe provisions for all of the missions makes a torque margin
unachievable without weight reduction or performance enhancements.

Engine Degradation
Another damaging performance assumption is the calculation of aircraft
performance with perfect or specification-level engines. The measurement for the
relative health of an engine is the Average Torque Factor or ATF. A 1.0 engine is an
engine that produces 100% of the specified power or 2828 shaft horsepower (SHP) at
1 00% main rotor speed. Since the missions mandated by the ORD require 100% of the
power available once the final configuration weight is added, there was no allowance for
degraded engines.· Adding to the problem is the fact that the average engine in the fleet
today is less than 1 .0 and is usually closer to a 0.93 or 7% degraded.
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In a sense, there are three end users of the MH-60S, the requirements officers who
author the ORD, the operational testers who verify ORD compliance, and ultimately the
fleet. The ORD remains silent on the ATF and the VROC values. In order to maximize
the performance in light of the increased weight for multi-mission provisions, it is
necessary to plan on the availability of 100% of the power available. For this reason,
performance calculations based on the ORD used the least conservative values of 1.0
ATF and O VROC. This serves to understate the weight and performance issues for both
the acquisition and requirements community. VX-1, the operational test squadron, will
perform the operational testing with MH-60S aircraft that are projected to have
approximately 200 flight hours on them. It is not unreasonable to expect that the engines
will have degraded to less than a 1.0 ATF. Furthermore, it is not clear what torque
margin will be utilized for mission planning but it is not unreasonable to assume that it
will be greater than 0%. Last and possibly most important is the fleet projection for the
MH-60S. Based on current employment of the H-60 in the fleet, the average engine will
have an ATF of 0.93 and a VROC of 500 fpm will be used as a planning metric.
The excessive weight growth as a result of multi-mission is a large enough
problem in itself. The problem is compounded by unclear and perhaps more stringent
than planned performance requirements. Weight growth is a fairly easy problem to
understand. As aircraft provisions are added in order to make the aircraft multi-mission
capable, aircraft empty gross weight subsequently increases. The performance related
issues are somewhat less easy to understand and even harder to foresee as a result of the
multi-mission requirement. The performance limiting factors are an intangible problem
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associated with an aircraft that must perform many missions. An example would be an
attack helicopter that must have excess power available in order to perform evasive or
offensive maneuvers. The same amount of excess power may not be required in a
transport helicopter that may only have a torque margin requirement to allow a safety
buffer when landing and taking off from the ship. Since the MH-60S must conduct both
of these mission in addition to many others, there is no one answer which will drive the
multi-mission design.
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IX. Mission Shortfalls
A simple analysis ·of the projected gross weight combined with the performance
degradation demonstrates the fact that the MH-60S will be unable to meet all of the ORD
missions in the FY 07 configuration. Tables A-4 and A-5, developed by the NAVAIR
Performance Branch, show projected mission performance in each mission profile. In
cases where capability is limited, the limiting factor is also listed.
For Tables A-4 and A-5, the white color indicates that the aircraft can meet the
mission without weight reduction or performance enhancement. The light gray indicates
that the aircraft is limited as a result of a HOGE limit or gross weight limit, but could
meet the mission if the requirements were reduced by a minimum amount. Dark gray is a
take off gross weight excursion. In many cases, the aircraft does not meet the mission
using the ORD assumptions (1.0 ATF/0 FPM VROC). When realistic parameters are
applied (0.93 ATF/500 FPM VROC), the performance deficit is made greater.
Furthermore, as the weight empty increases, the MH-60S is unable to perform the base
missions
The large number of missions and associated variables that must be analyzed
becomes a cumbersome task. The analysis can be simplified by comparing limiting
factors (gross weight and engine performance) to the various VROC and ATF
combinations. This analysis, presented in Table A-6, when performed for each mission
clearly summarizes MH-60S mission performance.
In Table A-6, the first number is the number of missions that the aircraft is able to
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perform. The number following the slash is the number of missions that are
limited by either gross weight or a performance limit. For example, for the seven basic
ORD missions, the aircraft can meet six of the requirements based on a 1.0 ATF and 0
VROC requirement. As 0.93 ATF and a 500 FPM VROC -is added the aircraft can only
complete four of the seven missions.
It is apparent from the previous analyses that in the final configuration of the MH60S, a combination of weight and reduction and performance enhancements will be
required. Rather than analyzing each mission, the most restrictive missions should be
analyzed. Specifically, mitigation paths need to be developed for the CSAR unrefueled,
SWS(OL), MIO, and the Q-20A (tropical and hot day) missions. Resolution to the
shortfalls to these design critical missions will obviously optimize the overall aircraft
capabilities.
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X.

Weight Savings Options

Obviously, the most efficient method to reduce weight in an aircraft is in the
design phase prior to 'bending of metal'. Since the requirement to reduce weight in the
MH-60S was not clearly identified until the post-production phase, the impact of a weight
reduction program will be significant. The task of identifying the easiest ways to
eliminate weight will be difficult. The difficulty of this task is compounded by the fact
that the aircraft is already in production and any changes may have to be retrofitted to
aircraft already delivered. The options to save weight can be compared utilizing many
factors such as cost, time to implement, ease of implementation, factory or field
modifications, and technological difficulty. For purposes of this thesis, options will be
categorized by ease of implementation.

Low Technology Insertion
Weight reduction options classified as low technology insertion utilize already in
production components which are 'form, fit, and function' components, but obviously
lighter than the current MH-60S component. One example of this is replacement of the
current pilot seats with a lighter version. This lighter version of the pilot seat has the
same function as the existing armored seats in the MH-60S and currently under
development for the Army UH-60M aircraft. Once development is complete, it is
expected that these seats will be 30 pounds lighter than the existing seats for a total
weight reduction of 60 pounds.
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Other examples of low technology insertion include lightweight fuel cells and the
addition of a kitable HIRSS (Helicopter Infrared Suppression System). Like, the
lightweight pilot seats, weight savings technology employed in the UH-60M can be
transferred to the MH-60S. In addition, new, lighter materials could be utilized to
fabricate the fuel tank. The tank used in the UH-60M is approximately 25 pounds lighter.
The UH-60M tanks in conjunction with a lighter material could save as much as 75
pounds in the MH-60S.
The HIRSS as currently installed on the MH-60S is a permanent change to the
engine exhaust. The HIRSS is only required for missions where the risk of exposure to
enemy IR missiles is high. For the AMCM and many of the basic missions the HIRSS is
extra weight that also happens to decrease the performance of the engine. There
currently exist two different designs that permit the HIRSS to be removed and reinstalled
when dictated by mission. Weight savings associated with removal of the HIRSS is 175
pounds. The associated increase in engine performance is approximately equal to 125
pounds in a hover (2% increase in SHP). Although, this provision will not help the
armed helicopter missions it does represent a sizeable weight reduction for AMCM.
Other relatively simple changes include the use of lighter materials such as
titanium instead of steel hydraulic lines and fasteners or the increased use of composites.
Although these changes are relatively simple from a technology standpoint they do
represent changes that are costly and more difficult to implement.
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Medium Technology Insertion
As the technological level of the proposed change to the aircraft becomes
increasingly difficult, the level of analysis required also increases. An example of a
medium technology insertion weight reduction option is the replacement of the aluminum
horizontal stabilator with a composite stabilator. This design is currently planned for the
UH-60M so the U.S. Navy would be in a position where they would either have to accept
the U.S. Army testing or conduct their own test program. The replacement of this
component, because it is safety critical, would require an extensive test program and
structural analysis.
The fourth hydraulic system installed as part of the AMCM aircraft provisions can
also be evaluated as a potential area of weight savings. Although it is planned that the
actual pump will be removed from the gearbox for all non-AMCM missions, the weight
of the plumbing and the reservoir will be a weight penalty for all missions. An
alternative to the fourth hydraulic pump is the design and fabrication of an electric motor
for the AMCM winch. The motor would be installed as part of the AMCM B-kit. Impact
to the aircraft is obviously an analysis of the electrical loads and the actual design
modifications to the current winch and associated control system. Potential savings for
an electric winch are anticipated to be approximately 82 pounds.
Another example of the medium technology insertion weight reduction is the
elimination of the fourth aircrewman for the AMCM mission. The weight that is planned
per crewman is 250 pounds. The design plan for the AMCM mission was a minimal
level of integration. In other words, the mission is planned to be executed by the 2
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crewmen in the rear of the aircraft. The pilots would of course be responsible for
minefield navigation and overall conduct of the mission. An example of the minimal
level of integration is that during the stream process of a Q-20, the pilots are unable to
monitor the status of the device. The plan is that one crewman would actually be
operating the winch while the other crewman would be controlling/monitoring the device
from the console; Once under tow, the fourth crewman would not have much to do until
the recovery process. Increasing the level of integration so that such stream and recovery
tasks could be conducted by the crewman sitting at the console with monitoring being
performed up front by the pilots. A simple analysis indicates that the majority of this
integration would be related to increasing the amount of information on the data bus and
subsequently making it available to the pilots. In other words, there would be little
weight penalty associated with the removal of the fourth crewman and the associated
seat. Further analysis, both in the human factors, crew systems and avionics arenas are
obviously required.

High Technology Insertion
High technology insertion items are those items that either represent the latest in
helicopter design or require a large amount of analysis and test. It follows that this
category would drive the largest impact to the design of the MH-60S and most likely take
the longest amount of time. Examples of high technology items include fly by wire
technology, wide chord main rotor blades, and active vibration control. There are also
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opportunities for insertion of technology for the purpose of weight decrease in AMCM in
the area of lighter tow cables and a weight reduction study for the AMCM sensors.

Cost
Throughout this section there was no mention of the cost of each of the options.
Similar to the design phase for an aircraft, cost per pound of weight lost can be
calculated. The previous discussion covered the wide range of changes that can be made
in order to lose weight. Because this part of the MH-60S was never initially planned, the
correct choice will obviously be based on fiscal constraints and how to get the largest
weight reduction for the lowest price with the least impact to the schedule.
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XI. Performance Improvements
In addition to an aggressive weight reduction program, the growth of the MH-60S
has resulted in a requirement to improve helicopter performance. The most compelling
reason is the need to increase takeoff gross weight and hover performance in the SWS,
CSAR and AMCM missions. Increased TOGW will permit the aircraft to leave the flight
deck with the requisite amount of fuel and mission equipment in order to meet the
combat radii mandated in the ORD mission profiles. As in the weight reduction program,
however, any performance enhancement decision must be based on impact to the aircraft.
This section is not intended to be inclusive; rather it is intended to demonstrate the
problems associated with even the simplest methods of increasing helicopter performance
in a postproduction environment.
There are many ways to increase the performance capabilities of a helicopter. An
obvious example would be through the use of wide chord main rotor blades mentioned in
i

the previous section. Another tactic is to evaluate the drve train and engines. A
simplistic explanation of this area is that the aircraft performance is limited by the
amount of power the engines can produce or limited by the amount of torque that the
main gearbox can accept. As an example, the main gearbox of the MH-60S is limited to

· 120% torque at airspeeds less than 80 knots. The only way to increase the ability to
accept increased shaft horsepower from the engines is to replace the gearbox. This is an
example of a performance enhancing change which would be cost and schedule
prohibitive since it would involve a completely new design not currently installed in any
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H-60 variant. There are cases, however, where the MH-60S is limited by the engine
power available and not gearbox input torque.

Engines
The engines currently installed in the aircraft are designated T700-401C engines.
For normal operating conditions, pilots operate this engine within their maximum
continuous turbine temperature specified in the NATOPS manual. When additional
power is required, the MH-60S NATOPS provides for an Instrument Rated Power (IRP)
setting for up to 30 minutes. Although not approved for use in the Navy variants of the
H-60, the U.S. Army also uses the T700, but has an additional I O-minute rating which
permits a time limited availability of increased shaft horsepower. This directly increases
the ability to hover in warm weather where the aircraft is engine limited.
Although implementing a 10 minute limit on the -401C engine seems like an
'easy' method to increase hot day hover performance, there is a large amount of analysis
which must be performed. With this increased demand on the engine is the
commensurate decrease in engine service life. Further analysis to determine exact life
penalty for this requirement. At the very least, an increase in engine asset availability
would be required throughout the fleet.
The U.S. Army is currently testing a new version of the T700 engine, the T-700701D, for use in the UH-60M. This engine, if approved for use in the MH-60S would
provide for up to 4% increase in shaft horsepower that equates to several hundred pounds
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of increased lift capability. Like the previous example, however, a large amount of
analysis and testing would be required prior to implementation.

Increased Nr
Another example of increasing takeoff and hover performance is by increasing
main rotor RPM. Increasing Nr would have two effects on performance. The first effect
would be in handling qualities where the main rotor would provide increased control
power at higher speeds. This would allow pilots to set a higher RPM when taking off and
landing at high gross weight from the ship. The second area where increased RPM
increases performance is at sea level conditions where the aircraft would be main gearbox
torque limited if the -401 D engine were installed.
Currently, the MH-60S is designed to operate at 100% Nr. In helicopter design,
the main rotor RPM impacts may areas. Prior to approving operations at any increased
rotor speed, effects to the engines, vibratory signature, electrical power, and dynamic
components would have to be evaluated. An additional impact is that in the current
design there is no method to set an Nr at any value over 101.5%. The control system
would have to be modified to allow the pilot to set t:Jr at 103 or 105%.

Engine Health
In Chapter VIII, the fact that the ORD considered that the engines were operating
at 1.0 ATF or were producing specification power is challenging In actuality, the
average engine in the fleet is degraded as much as 7% thereby decreasing power
available. Given an unlimited supply of engines and manpower, an engine would be
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removed and replaced as soon as its health decreased below 100%. Reality has driven the
removal criteria to 0.93. Anything that can be done from an engine logistics and
reliability/maintainability standpoint would serve to indirectly increase MH-60S
performance. An example of this might be robust compressor blades that are less
susceptible to erosion from salt spray and sand. By affecting the overall health of the
engines in the fleet so that the average engine becomes a 0.95 ATF, performance gains
would be realized without directly changing anything on the aircraft.
Similar to the weight reduction discussion, the correct performance enhancement
solution will be a combination of various items. A prime example would be the
incorporation of the -701D engines with increased main rotor RPM for takeoffs and
landings. The goal, of course, must be to increase the performance abilities of the
aircraft so that the maximum takeoff gross weight specified in the NA TOPS of 23,500
pounds could be realized.
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XII. Recommendations
The on-going and planned multi-mission modifications to the MH-60S pose many
unprecedented challenges for the Naval Aviation Systems Command and contractor
teams. In theory, its intended mission should drive the design of a helicopter. The most
stringent missions should play a major role in the design characteristics. In the case of
the MH-60S, however, the challenge becomes weight reduction and performance
enhancements in a production helicopter. In order to compensate for the impacts of the
multi-mission capability, the following should be investigated:
1 . Requirements Definition: The requirements were written utilizing current mission
needs that were in tum based on a dedicated platform for each mission. No regard was
given for the potential degradation in performance resulting from one aircraft performing
many diverse missions. The fact that the MH-60S will be organic to the battle group and
able to be used for many missions at the discretion of the Battle Group Commander is an
enhancing characteristic that is not currently taken into account by the requirements
generation process. The current requirements need to be re-evaluated based on the actual
requirements and not based on the capability of the legacy aircraft. Additionally, the
derived benefit of having this asset readily available should be factored in.
2. Spiral performance 'buy back': Weight reduction studies and performance
enhancements should be evaluated based on cost and benefits. Once decided upon, .
"performance" should be "bought back" along the same schedule as the spiral acquisition
path. An example of such a performance buy back plan follows:
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•Block 2A - FY03
-Kitable HIRSS
-New pilot seats (from the UH-60M)
-Fuel tank (from the UH-60M)
•Block 3A - FY05
-Utilize refueling probe
-Reduce unrefueled range requirement in ORD
-Reduce number of SWS(OL) crew in ORD
•Block 3B - FY06
-401 D Engine upgrade
-Develop active vibration controls to allow increased Nr operations
--Composite stabilator
•Block 2B - FY07
-Tow cable or removal of fourth AMCM crewman
-4th stage hydraulic pump removal
As new capability is added a commensurate amount of performance should be substituted
through a combination of weight reduction, performance enhancements, and
requirements analysis. A plan of this type should be added to the acquisition strategy and
incorporated as part of the production line for each block.
3.

Mission Analysis: Rather than analyzing 20 different missions, the requirements

should be based on a subset containing the most stringent missions. The task of analyzing
many different missions and all possible variations is difficult as shown in Chapter V.
The task could be simplified by only defining/mandating requirements for
the most stringent base mission, the most stringent armed helicopter mission and the most
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stringent AMCM mission. These mission profiles would drive future weight
reduction/performance enhancements. It follows that if the most difficult missions were�
considered, overall performance of the air vehicle would be optimized.
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XIII. Conclusion
Even the brief analyses presented in this thesis demonstrate the intricacies
involved in the conduct of the AMCM and armed helicopter missions. The weight growth
associated with increasing the MH-60S capabilities was not planned. The mission
profiles are reminiscent of the way that the missions are currently conducted with
platforms dedicated to that specific mission; specifically, the MH-53E for the AMCM
mission and the HH-60H for the armed helicopter mission. Inevitably some mission
profiles will have to be reduced as there is no compensation planned for the synergies
gained by conducting all missions in one aircraft.
Design requirements for a helicopter can be thought of as a chair with four legs.
Each leg can be symbolized by the following design attributes: weight, performance,
engines, and requirements. The first three are not easily changed once the aircraft is in
production. The fourth is relatively easy to change.
If the MH-60S were a new aircraft it would have a specification that detailed
engine ratings, transmission limits, rotor disk area, tip speed, solidity, and mission
performance calculations with clearly stated ground rules. Additionally, design work
would be performed taking the necessity of additional margin into account. This would
be required to allow for weight growth and performance degradation over the life cycle.
The decision to transition to one type of helicopter for the U.S. Navy has been the
subject of many studies. This strategy, officially adopted as part of the HMP, will change
the way the Navy of the future operates both tactically and fiscally.
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The multi-mission concept will have many tangible and intangible effects. The
tangible effects will be the cost associated with a weight reduction and performance
enhancement upgrades to the MH-60S. Intangible and unknown impacts will be the
potential sub optimization of each mission the MH-60S will be required to perform.
It

is not possible for an aircraft to do all missions perfectly. Nor is it possible for

the MH-60S to perform to the same level as an aircraft that was optimized for a particular
mission. The resultant situation is that the Navy will be forced to purchase an aircraft that
can do all missions to an acceptable level. The acceptable level will have to be arrived at
based on revision of the way the Navy currently operates.
It is surmised that this

acceptable level will someday, once again based on weight

reduction and performance enhancements, be within the limits of the MH-60S. If the
MH-60S cannot perform all missions at this acceptable level then there are one of three
outcomes. The first and least desirable is that the Navy accepts the fact that it will not
meet war fighting requirements. The second is that the Navy aborts the one type aircraft
plan. The third is that the Navy operates a 'split' fleet of MH-60S aircraft where some
aircraft are designated VERTREP only, some are AMCM only and some are armed
helicopter only.
Of course, the above postulation over simplifies the situation and does not take

into account advancement in tactics and war fighting technology associated with
integrating the latest, state of the art sensors and weapons into the MH-60S. It does serve
however to demonstrate the magnitude of the decision to transition to the MH-60S for all

71

missions. It also highlights the difficulty of designing for many missions let alone
making post production changes to account for multi-mission related airframe changes.
The plan to utilize one helicopter for many missions is clearly highly pragmatic.
The cost and final capability once all modifications are complete is yet to be seen. The
only way the program will succeed is through continued analysis and careful planning to
counter the effects of adding multi-mission weight over time.
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TABLE A-1: SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

MISSION

KPP

PAYLOAD

VERTREP

YES

5500 lbs

VOD

YES

5500 lbs

AMPHID SAR

YES

Up to 1 2

Airhead
NEO
MEDEVAC
SWS(OW)

-

---

-

RANGE(nm)

ENDURANCE
(hrs)

--

1 .7 hrs

--

1 00 nm

---

5500 lbs
1 2 pax

50 nm
1 2 nm
1 00 nm

--

4 pax

1 00 nm

--

8 troops

50 nm

MISSION

KPP

TOS (min)

ROA (nm)

AQS-20X /OASIS Trop Day

YES

60 min

30 nm

AQS-20X/OASIS Hot Day

YES

30 min

1 0 nm

ALMOS

YES

1 20 min

30 nm

AMNS {Tethered)

YES

75 min

30 nm

RAMICS

YES

75 min

30 nm

MISSION

KPP

PAYLOAD

RANGE (nm)

CSAR

YES

4 Pax

200 nm

SWS(OL)

YES

8 Troops

200 nm

MIO
ASUW

YES

8 Troops

--

CV PLN GD

(Source: PMA Brief)
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50 nm

--

--

5 Pax

1 00 nm

TABLE A-2: MULTI-MISSION GROSS WEIGHT IMPACT
Item
Armed Helicopter A-Kit
AMCM A-Kit
TCDL

Weight (lbs)
391
333
57

Total

781
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TABLE A-3: H-60 WEIGHT GROWTH
Item
MH-60S weight empty (UH-60L plus
marinization weight)
IMD/HUMS
Manufacturing Variation
Discrepancy resolution (Vibration
absorbers)
A-Kits
Total

80

Weight (lbs)
13,802

73
70
12
78 1
14,738

TABLE A-4: MISSION PROFILE SUMMARY (BASIC AND AH)

M ission
VERTREP

Re uirement
5500max/3,000avg
1 .75 hrs

X

VOD

4,500max/3000avg
I 00 N M

X

Amphibious SAR

Kl'P
X

A IRHEAD

X

208.6 nm

Up to + 12 PAX
50 NM
5,500max
1 2 NM

0 1 K/90 deg HOGE
(Performance Limit)
12 pax
94.2 nm

M EDEVAC

4 Pax
I 00 NM

: 4 Pax
2.:fo NM

SWS (OW)

8 SEALs
50 NM

89;3 nm

89.3 nm

2 survivors
200 NM
2 survivors
200 NM
8 SEALs
200 NM

1 57 NM

60 NM

440 N'M

0 NM

1 1 6 NM

58 N M

CSA R (unrefueled)

SWSOL (unfueled)

CV PLN GD
M IO

Limit

6581/5 7 1 4 lbs · · 48 1 6/3943 lbs
1 . 84 hrs
. l.74 hrs

12 Pax
I 00 NM

SWSOL (refueled)

X

ATF = 0.93,
VROC = 500

NEO

CSAR (refueled)
X

ATF = 1 .0,
VROC = 0

365 NM

8 S EALs
200 NM
5 survivors
I 00 NM
8 SEALs
80 NM

4K/90 deg HOGE
(Performance Limit)

Mid-Mission HOGE (3K I
90F) (Perf. Limit)
M id-M ission HOGE
TOGW & M id-M ission
HOGE (Performance Limit)

226 NM (329 Mid-M ission HOGE
(Performance Limit)
w/ 1 0 min)
2 Aux Tanks req'd. TOGW
limit.
TOGW
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TABLE A-5: AMCM MISSION PROFILE SUMMARY
Mission
AQS-20X Towing
Trop

Requirement
60 Min
30 NM

X

AQS-20X Towing
Hot

30 Min
1 0 NM

Gross Weight Limit

X

OASIS Towing
Trop

60 Min
30 N M

Gross Weight Limit

X

OAS IS Towing
Hot

30 Min
1 0 NM

Gross Weight Limit

KPP

X

X

1 ALMOS
Trap

Gross Weight Limit

1 20 Min
30 NM

X

RAMICS
Trop

75 Min
30 NM

69 min
(1 50 lb)

X

AMNS (Tethered)
Trop

75 Min
30 N M

1 03 min

X

A M N S (Untethered)
Trop

1 20 Min
30 NM

1 48 min

1 24 min

Upwind /
Downwind

Upwind /
Downwind

Minutes

Minutes

I
-----------------30 up / 30 down
AQS-20X Towing
T rop Downwind
OASIS Towing
Downwind

30 NM

Trop 30 up / 30 down
30 N M

1 500 ft HOGE (Perf.
I Limit)
( I RP wt-t-perf wt) (Perf.
Limit)

V

;

I

�

...,

�
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TABLE A-6: SUMMARY OF MH-60S MISSION PERFORMANCE

Basic ORD

7 Total
3 KPP

ATF=l .0
VROC=0

ATF=0.93
VROC=500

6/1
3/0

4/3
2/1

3/3
1 /2

0/6
0/3

3/7
3/5

2/8
2/8

Armed Helo
6 Total
3 KPP
AMCM
10 Total
8 KPP

(Source: PMA Brief)
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Organic Airborne Mine
Counfermeasures (OAMCM)

FIGURE B-1 : OAMCM SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT
(Source: PMA Briefing Slide)
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Hover IR Suppressor
H H-60H Transmissimvl>rivc Train
Hl l -60H Tail Rotor

Tail Cone Bulkhead*

flight C(1ntro!s

UH -hU [ Fuel Cells

Navy H-60 Cockpit Doors
\/u,, :, H-60 Common Cot:kpit "'

---.._...__

",, � Cabin Cargo Handling System•

� ....__......__--==--�{z} External Shires Stmdural Provisions
\

�

(runner's Wind('"
Wir...•s1rikc System

UH-60L Landing {i;;•ar

a Existing mackhuwk
■ Seahawk Common

■
FIGURE B-2: MH-60S COMPONENTS
(Source: Ibid)
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New Development

I

I

1A

I

I
I

I

Block IA - 237 Aircraft
Block I B - 20 1 Aircraft
Block 2A - 1 89 Aircraft
Block 2B - 153 Aircraft
Block 3A - 152 Aircraft
Block 3B - 1 30 Aircraft
� IMO/HUMS

Ba sic Vert Rep, Amphibious SAR

1 8 1 + Internal Aux Ta nk Capable

2A

1B + Console, CSTRS, ASQ-20X, ALMOS, AMNS

28 2 A + TCOL, OASIS, RAMICS

3A
38

2B + Side Suppression Weapon, FLIR (MTS), Mission Computer, Second Aux Ta nk
3A + Precision guided Munition, Forward Firing Weapon, Llnk-16, Integrated Self
Defense, Dlgltal Moving Map, Helmet Mounted Dlsplay, Improved FLIR Mount

FIGURE B-3: AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
(Source: Ibid)
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I

I

I
I
I

MH-60S Program

Combat Support: IOC FY02
•

Replaces the Aging H-46D,
HH-60H HH-lN, and H-3 with a
Newly Manufactured H-60 Airframe

•

Supports Helo CONOPS Throu9h
Reduction of Type/Model/Senes
from 7 to 3
New Production of 237 A/ C
5000 + LBS Internal/External cargo
Fully Integrated Glass Cockpit and
Mission Sensor Suite
Cockpit Common with MH-60R

•
•
•
•

BLOCK 2A: IOC CY 05
•

•
•
•
•

Carriage, Stream, Tow and
Recovery System (CSTRS)
Common Console
Auxiliary Fuel Tank
AN/AQS-20A Sonar Mine
Detection Set1
AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine
Detection System (ALMDS) 1

BLOCK 28: IOC FY07
• Sensor Link
•
•
•

Airborne Mine Neutralization
System (AMNS) 1
Organic Airborne & Surface
Influence Sweep (OASIS)1
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance
System (RAMICS) 1

1 PMS-210 Development Items

BLOCK 3A: IOC FY06

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR)
Crew Served Guns
Additional Aux Tank
Mission Computer
External Weapons Mount System
Integrated Self Defense ((SD) System
Precision Guided Munition Air to Ground
Fuel Probe

BLOCK 38: IOC FY07
•

Link 16

BLOCK JC: (Planned; IOC TBD)
•
•
•
•

Digital Moving Map
Helmet Mounted Display
Improved FLIR Mount
Forward Firing Weapon

FIGURE B-4: MH-60S SPIRAL ACQUISITION STRATEGY
(Source: Ibid)
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FIGURE B-5: AMCM STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS
(Source: Ibid)
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Vita
Commander Steven E. Halpern was born in Queens, New York on 13 May 1965.
In July 1983, he entered the United States Naval Academy and graduated in May 1987
with a B.S. in General Engineering. Upon graduation, he was commissioned an Ensign
in the United States Navy and reported to Pensacola, Florida for flight training. In May
1989, he earned his "wings" and began follow-on flight training in the SH-3 Sea King
helicopter. Commander Halpern's first assignment was at NAS Patuxent River, MD as a
Search and Rescue pilot. Following his first assignment, he was selected for transition
training to the MH-53E "Sea Dragon" in Norfolk Virginia. In 1991, Commander
Halpern reported to HM-14 where he made numerous detachments in support of the
Airborne Mine Countermeasures mission. In 1995, Commander Halpern was selected for
Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS). Following graduation from USNTPS, Commander
Halpern reported to the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron as the MH-53E
platform coordinator and Dynamic Interface Department Head. In this capacity, he was
in charge of several H-53E dynamic interface detachments and was a project officer for
both Navy and USMC test programs. In 1999, Commander Halpern reported to HM-15
in Corpus Christi, Texas for his Department Head tour. While at HM-15, Commander
Halpern held the billets of Admin Officer and then Maintenance Officer as well as
detachment Officer in Charge. In recognition of superior performance while assigned as
HM-15 Maintenance Officer, Commander Halpern was recognized as the NHA
Maintenance Officer of the Year 2002.
90

In November 2001, Commander Halpern reported to Naval Air Systems Command and
held the Aviation Training Lead and his current assignment, Mission Systems IPT Lead
on the MH-60S program.
Commander Halpern has completed Joint Professional Military Education at Air
Command and Staff, Air University and is a graduate of the Advanced Program
Management Course, Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition
University.
Commander Halpern has been selected for aviation command and will report to
Norfolk, Virginia in May 2003. In the Fall 2003, Commander Halpern will become the
Commanding Officer, Airborne Mine Countermeasures Weapons Systems Training
School.
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